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Mr. Fordham stands by his legal analysis, and its application to the
instant dispute, that is set forth in his Opening Brief. He seeks to refrain from
unnecessarily repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which he
remains confident, that appear in that Brief.
I.

MR. OLDROYD HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE
"FIREMAN'S RULE" IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH THE
DISTRICT COURT COULD CONCEIVABLY HAVE GRANTED
HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HAS FAILED
TO COUNTER IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF MR. FORDHAM'S
ARGUMENT.

Mr. Oldroyd has in his Brief acknowledged that the only conceivable
basis for the District Court's granting him summary judgment and refusing to
allow this case to go to trial is application of the "Fireman's Rule."
Mr. Oldroyd has also failed satisfactorily to counter important aspects of
the argument set forth in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief, including the following:
the proposition that application of the Fireman's Rule runs afoul of the Utah
statutory scheme; the proposition that application of the Fireman's Rule runs
afoul of the fundamental principle of Utah tort law that each person whose
negligence proximately contributes to an injury should bear his proportionate
share of fault for his conduct and pay his proportionate share of damages
caused by his conduct; the proposition that application of the Fireman's Rule
unfairly discriminates against Utah public safety officers; the proposition that

the original basis of the Fireman's Rule is not applicable to the facts of this
case; and (implicitly), by acknowledging (at p. 11 of his Brief) that the
Fireman's Rule does not work to bar Mr. Fordham's claim against the driver
whose vehicle struck him,1 the proposition that the Fireman's Rule is logically
and legally inconsistent.
The Court may fairly infer that Mr. Oldroyd's failure satisfactorily to
respond to these contentions is not as a result of lack of thoroughness on his
counsel's part but based on the fact that no good arguments can be made
against them.
II.

MR. OLDROYD INCORRECTLY SUGGESTS THAT THE
FIREMAN'S RULE APPLIES ONLY TO CLAIMS OF PEACE
OFFICERS WHO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR
ASSISTANCE BY PEOPLE SUCH AS MR. OLDROYD.

Near the conclusion of his Brief, at 12, Mr. Oldroyd contends:
The [Fireman's] Rule recognizes that citizens should be free to summon
help from professional rescuers without concern that they might later be
sued by the public safety officer if he or she happens to be injured while
confronting a hazard in the course and scope of his or her employment.
To hold otherwise could constitute a [deterrent] to citizens summoning
help when in need and would essentially create a double recovery for
1

As explained in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief at 18-20, the supposed
philosophical underpinnings of the Fireman's Rule - including the notion that
public safety officers are paid to encounter risks in the course of their
employment - should, if consistently applied, prevent public safety officers
from pursuing claims against anyone whose negligence causes them to be
injured - not only those whose antecedent negligence causes them to be at a
given scene, but also those whose negligence injures them while they are at
the scene.
2

public safety officers injured in the course of their employment while
receiving compensation for doing their jobs.2
The fact of the matter is that the Fireman's Rule, in its broadest
application urged by Mr. Oldroyd, would work to prevent Mr. Fordham from
recovering against Mr. Oldroyd regardless of whether Mr. Oldroyd himself
made a "911" call or otherwise summoned aid. According to Mr. Oldroyd's
overall position, the Fireman's Rule would prevent Mr. Fordham from
recovering damages from Mr. Oldroyd regardless of whether someone else
reported Mr. Oldroyd's own rollover incident and regardless of whether
Mr. Fordham had just happened upon the scene.3
It is also worthy of note that the Fireman's Rule would not prohibit claims
of, for example (this is but one example of the discriminatory nature of the
Rule), ambulance personnel and paramedics responding to accident scenes
caused by the negligence of people such as Mr. Oldroyd if such emergency

2

For reasons explained in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief, at 12-13, the
reference to "double recovery" in the final sentence of this excerpt from
Mr. Oldroyd's Brief should be given no significant consideration. For a basic
rule of Utah law (see Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-106) is that people injured while
doing their jobs have the statutory right, even though they receive workers
compensation benefits, to pursue claims against those whose negligence has
caused them to sustain damages.
3

Indeed, in this case, it was someone else (an occupant of a vehicle that was
already at the scene), and not Mr. Oldroyd, who made the "911" call. R. 6263.
3

responders should happen to be struck by vehicles such as the vehicle driven
by the person who struck Mr. Fordham.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT BE PERSUADED BY THE MERE
FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS HEW TO
THE FIREMAN'S RULE, GENERALLY OR AS APPLIED TO
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

Mr. Oldroyd relies heavily on the proposition that the majority of
jurisdictions still, apparently, cling to the Fireman's Rule. This Court is, of
course, not bound by the case law of other jurisdictions. This Court should
look at relevant policy considerations, the discriminatory nature of the Rule, its
lack of consistent application, and the fact that basic principles of established
Utah tort common and statutory law are not necessarily parts of the law of the
states that have adopted and still apply the Rule. Applying the Fireman's Rule
to Mr. Fordham's claim simply on the basis of a "head count" of decisions from
around the country is not intellectually or legally satisfying.
IV.

OTHER JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN ADDITION TO
THOSE CITED AND DISCUSSED IN MR. FORDHAM'S
OPENING BRIEF, AS WELL AS COGENT ANALYSES BY
VARIOUS COMMENTATORS, SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION
THAT THE FIREMAN'S RULE, GENERALLY OR AS APPLIED
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SHOULD NOT WORK TO
PREVENT MR. FORDHAM FROM PRESENTING HIS CASE
AGAINST Mr. OLDROYD TO A JURY.

In Wills v. Bath Excavating & Constr. Co., 829 P.2d 405, 409 (Colo. App.
1991), the Colorado Court of Appeals explained:
4

We agree with the Banvai [799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990), a case
discussed in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief at 15-16] analysis that, while
a public safety officer's special skills, training, and experience may be
considered with reference to any comparative negligence involved, a per
se grant of immunity to those whose negligence created a dangerous
situation for the officer is unwarranted. In consequence, we conclude
that the fireman's rule is no longer the law in Colorado.
The doctrine of assumption of risk is the law in Colorado and poses a
question for the trier of fact. And, while not a complete bar to recovery,
the assumption of risk is to be considered by the trier of fact in
apportioning negligence. [Citation omitted.] Further because
assumption of risk is a question for the trier of fact, it may not be
decided on summary judgment. [Citation omitted.]
Finally, we are not unmindful of the worthwhile public policy
considerations which have given rise to the fireman's rule. We are also
aware of the widespread, albeit often restricted, adoption of the principle
in other jurisdictions. However we leave to the General Assembly any
assignment of legal acceptance of the negligence of others to firemen,
policemen, or any other public safety officers.
The judgment [in favor of entities similarly situated to Mr. Oldroyd] is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.
In Court v. Grzelinski. 379 N.E.2d 281, 285 (III. 1978), the Illinois
Supreme Court held:
... to the extent a fireman is a person to whom injury from [a] product
may reasonably be foreseen, he may recover in products liability, even
though his injury was incurred while fighting a fire in the course of his
employment. In so holding, we reject the opportunity to extend the
"fireman's rule" beyond its limited context of landowner/occupier liability.
Also, in an insightful dissent, in Walters v. Sloan. 571 P.2d 609, 20
Cal.3d 199, 212-13 (Cal. 1977), Acting Chief Justice Tobriner wrote:

5

Proponents of the fireman's rule argue most frequently that it is the
fireman's job to extinguish fires and the policeman's job to make arrests.
They conclude that a fireman or policeman can base no tort claim upon
damage caused by the very risk that he is paid to encounter and with
which he is trained to cope. The argument, in essence, is that the
fireman or policeman, in accepting the salary and fringe benefits offered
for his job, assumes all normal risks inherent in his employment as a
matter of law, and thus may not recover from one who negligently
creates such a risk. [Citations omitted.]
The fallacy in this argument is simply that it proves too much. Under
this analysis an employee would routinely be barred from bringing a tort
action whenever an injury he suffers at the hands of a negligent
tortfeasor could be characterized as a normal inherent risk of his
employment. Yet, as noted above, past California cases have regularly
permitted highway workers - whose jobs obviously subject them to the
"inherent risk" of being injured by a negligent driver — to recover for
damages inflicted by such third party negligence [citation omitted] and
have permitted construction workers - whose employment poses
numerous risks of injury at the hands of another - to recover tort
damages for work-related injuries so long as the negligent tortfeasor is
not their employer. [Citation omitted.]
As these and countless other cases demonstrate, while policemen and
firemen regularly face substantial hazards in the course of their
employment and are, theoretically at least, compensated for such risks,
a host of other employees - highway repairmen, highrise construction
workers, utility repairmen and the like - frequently encounter
comparable risks in performing their jobs and, again theoretically, also
receive compensation for such risks. California decisions have never
perceived such theoretical compensation as a sufficient basis for barring
the employee's cause of action against a negligent tortfeasor.
The author of Case Note: Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Company -Arkansas Adopts the Fireman's Rule: Do Volunteer Firefighters Get Burned
Twice?. 50 Ark. L. Rev. 363, 374-75 (1997), wrote:

6

By denying a public safety officer recovery from a negligent tortfeasor
the officer is not directed to recover his damages from the general
public; rather the officer is totally precluded from recovering these
damages from anyone. Contrast this with other public employees who
are injured when confronting dangers on their jobs. The latter can
recover workers' compensation and salary benefits from the public, but
are also allowed additional tort damages from the third-party tortfeasors.
Under the "fireman's rule" the injured public safety officer must bear a
loss which other public employees are not required to bear.
The author of Note: Equal Protection and the Fireman's Rule in Ohio,
38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 123, 144 (1988), wrote:
The common law governing the suits of firemen and policemen against
tortfeasors for personal injury damages is in need of a complete
restructuring. The most traditional fireman's rule bars firemen from
recovery for injuries directly resulting from a fire and categorize them as
licensees in their suits against landowners for injury resulting from the
negligent maintenance of their property. The Ohio courts have not
modernized, or indeed even altered to any extent, this rule since its
creation, and the landowner's duty system upon which it is based is
outdated.
The determination of whether firemen and policemen can recover for
their injuries should depend instead, upon the presence of fault, the
basis of all tort law. In short, the property owner should be liable to the
[fireman] for his injuries directly resulting from the fire when the
landowner negligently or intentionally caused the fire. The fireman
should be owed that same duty of care owed to rescuers and public and
private employees - a general duty of care owed to all foreseeably
injured.
This restructuring would remedy the inequitable treatment suffered by
firemen and policemen, and at the same time, would further two
important public policies. Allowing recovery by firemen would serve to
deter negligence in causing fires and would encourage persons to enter
this important area of public service which asks man every day to put
another's safety and welfare before his own.

7

The author of Note: Has the Michigan Firefighter's Rule Gone up in
Smoke? An Analysis of the Wilful and Wanton Exception, 44 Wayne L. Rev.
1555, 1572-77 (Fall 1998), wrote:
It is unjust to assign firefighters and police officers, officials who risk
their lives to protect the public, to a status less than that of every other
citizen. In essence, the courts are creating individualized duties of care
based on occupational status, a practice that no Michigan court
expressly condones.
Further defects in the policy argument are seen in the inadequacy and
harmful effects that can result from forcing police officers and firefighters
to rely solely on workers' compensation. The courts have immunized
tortfeasors from liability arising from their negligent misconduct by
limiting safety officials to statutory recovery. This in turn fosters
negligent behavior. People have no incentive to take proper precautions
for fire prevention and criminals are afforded a greater degree of
recklessness. While negligent citizens are being provided immunity,
injured officers are being deprived adequate recovery as workers'
compensation is generally inferior to a tort recovery.
The notion that workers' compensation will best spread the cost of
officers' injuries to the public as a whole is also a fallacy. Since
taxpayers provide funds for the worker's compensation benefits that pay
injured officers, the system requires citizens who act non-negligently to
pay for the misconduct of other citizens. The firefighter's rule forces the
individual safety officer and the non-negligent citizen to unfairly shoulder
this burden. Allowing safety officials to pursue third-party tort claims
would alleviate this burden and would allow worker's compensation
insurers the right of subrogation to any proceeds from a third-party
award, reducing overall taxpayer expenses.

The analysis is simple. Courts will merely apply general principles of
negligence in determining whether recovery should be permitted to a
particular public safety officer. Fundamental concepts of duty, breach,
causation, and damages will determine liability instead of the current
8

complicated and ambiguous exceptions. The trier of fact will consider
whether "a defendant breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff," and
whether that breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. Where a plaintiff fails to act reasonably under the
circumstances, the general principles of comparative negligence will
diminish the recovery. This system, grounded in familiar legal theories
in which attorneys and courts are well-versed, will grant the greatest
assurances of safety, cost prevention, efficiency and justice. Such a
system will give firefighters and police officers a chance to recover the
rights and privileges that a poorly conceived and poorly executed rule of
law has stolen.
V.

CONCLUSION

As has been articulated in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and in the
foregoing analysis and examples of case law and commentary treatment of the
issue, this Court should rule that no part of the Fireman's Rule is or should be
part of the common law of the State of Utah. There are compelling reasons to
so rule and no truly satisfactory reason to rule otherwise.
Alternatively, and if this Court is somehow persuaded that the original
purpose of the Fireman's Rule - to insulate from liability landowners whose
negligence causes firefighters to arrive at scenes of fires - for whatever
reason makes sense, this Court should follow the cases, discussed in
Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and in this Brief, that limit application of the
Fireman's Rule to such circumstances only (circumstances that are not
present in this case).

9

This Court should, in any event, rule that the Fireman's Rule does not
preclude Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claims against Mr. Oldroyd and
should, accordingly, reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment
and instruct the District Court to allow this case to proceed to trial.
Respectfully submitted this

^/-^"day of September, 2005.

PETER C. COLLINS
PETER C. COLLINS, LLC.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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